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Dimitrios th. VachaViolos
ChurCh union and ΒalanCe of Powers in late Byzantium: 
the testimony of GeorGe sPhrantzes*
The Council of Ferrara-Florence (1438-1439) is a momentous event in the 
ecclesiastical history of Late Byzantium, mainly because it was the last joint 
attempt to heal Christian division1. Apart from its importance as a historical 
ecclesiastical meeting, it is a major event with significant political, cultural, 
and social implications. For this reason, this Council not only preoccupied 
the ecclesiastical and secular writers of its time, with the latter focusing 
primarily on its importance with relation to the imminent Ottoman threat. 
Extensive or shorter references and comments on this council are found, 
among others, in the works of Doukas2, Laonicus Chalcocondyles3 and 
* A version of this paper was first presented at the 46th Conference of the Greek 
Association of Philologists (Corinth, 7-9 November 2019). I am grateful to Professor Emeritus 
Apostolos Karpozilos (University of Ioannina) and to the anonymous reviewers for their 
invaluable remarks and bibliographic suggestions.
1. For a comprehensive presentation of the literature on the Ferrara-Florence Council, 
see La théologie byzantine et sa tradition, eds. C.G. ContiCello – V. ContiCello, v. II, Turnhout 
2002, 468-475· M.-H. BlanChet – S. Kolditz, Le concile de Ferrara-Florence (1438-1439): 
mise à jour bibliographique, Medioevo greco 13 (2013), 315-321.  
2. Ducas, Istoria Turco-Byzantină (1341-1462), ed. V. GreCu [Scriptores Byzantini I], 
Bucureşti 1958, ΧΧΧΙ, 9, 269-271: 269-271, XXXVI, 4-6: 317-319 [hereafter: Ducas, Istoria 
Turco-Byzantină].  
3. Laonicus Chalkokondyles, Historiarum Demonstrationes, ed. euG. darKò, v. I, 
Budapest 1922, I, 5-6, VI, 67-69. Cf. also Laonikos Chalkokondyles, The Histories, v. 1-2, 
transl. by A. Kaldellis [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library], Harvard University Press 
2014. For this issue, see also N.G. NikolouDis, Laonikos Chalkokondyles on the Council of 
Florence, Εκκλησιαστικός Φάρος 74/2 (1992) n.s. 3, 132-134.  
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George Sphrantzes4. Their reports do not contain extensive descriptions 
of events during or beyond the scope of the works of the Council. Their 
significance lie mainly on the fact that they are valuable testimonies, which 
enable us to understand how the Council was received and assessed after 
the tragic event of the Fall of Constantinople and the dissolution of the 
Christian Roman Empire by contemporary writers who were not members 
of ecclesiastical circles. Thus, their reports are based rather on emotional 
and political criteria than on theological views and convictions, therefore 
offering a completely different view of the Council and consequently the 
unifying policy adopted by the emperor John the VIII Palaeologus (1422–
1448) than that given by ecclesiastical writers5.
This paper focuses on George Sphrantzes’ assessment of the Council in 
his Chronicle, which was written just a few decades after the Fall in Corfu, 
where he had taken refuge. George Sphrantzes, οἰκεῖος and secretary of the 
emperor Manuel II (1391–1425) and a close associate of the Despot and 
later Emperor Constantine XI Palaeologus (1449-1453), wrote a chronicle 
covering the period from 1413 to 14776. The author records in his work, 
4. Giorgio Sfranze, Cronaca, ed. R. maisaNo [CFHB XXIX], Roma 1990, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 1-4: 
80, 1-29 [hereafter: Sfranze, Cronaca].
5. A first overall approach to this issue was attempted by  Dr. Theodora Papadopoulou 
in her unpublished paper: “The Council of Ferrara-Florence in the work of four of the 
main historiographers of the Fall” at the conference “The Union of Florence (1439-2009)” 
(Cluj-Napoca / Klausenburg / Kolozsvár, 22-24 October 2009), which was organized by 
the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Institut für Byzanzforschung (ÖAW), Wien and the 
Romanian Academy, Center of Transylvanian Studies. I am grateful to Dr. Papadopoulou 
for allowing me to consult her unpublished paper.
6. For Georgios Sphrantzes, his Chronicle, and related literature, see M. PhiliPPides – W. 
K. haNak, The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, 
and Military Studies, Farnham – Burlington, VT 2011, 139-192 [hereafter: PhiliPPides – 
haNak, The Siege and the Fall]; aP. KarPozilos, Βυζαντινοί Ιστορικοί και Χρονογράφοι, 
vol. IV: (13ος – 15ος αι.), Athens 2015, 571-592 [hereafter: KarPozilos, Βυζαντινοί Ιστορικοί 
και Χρονογράφοι]; V. déroChe, “Sphrantzès, Chronikon: Ιntroduction”, in: Constantinople 
1453. Des Byzantins aux Ottomans, eds V. déroChe – n. Vatin, Toulouse 2016, 233-235; l. 
neVille, Guide to Byzantine Historical Writing, Cambridge 2018, 302-307; al. G. C. saVVides, 
Βυζαντινό Ιστοριογραφικό Ενδεκάπτυχο: Ζώσιμος – Προκόπιος – Θεοφάνης – Ιωάννης 
Σκυλίτζης και Συνεχιστής – Γεώργιος Κεδρηνός – Μιχαήλ Ψελλός – Άννα Κομνηνή – 
Ιωάννης Κίνναμος – Θεόδωρος Σκουταριώτης – Γεώργιος Σφραντζής. Συμβολή για τους 
ιστοριογράφους και την εποχή τους, Athens 32019, 213-244.
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based on diary notes that he seems to have kept for several years, events 
mainly related to his life, his service in the court and his advancement in the 
court hierarchy, which gives this work rather the form of memoir7. He does 
not omit, however, to recall important historical events, such as the Ottoman 
siege of Constantinople in 14228, the Ottoman occupation of Thessaloniki 
(1430)9 or the Battle of Varna (1444)10. It is surprising that the tragic event 
of the Fall is limited to a very short note, even though he witnessed it11. 
After the Fall he served the despot Thomas Palaeologus in the Peloponnese, 
before ending up in Corfu, where he was a refugee and homeless, becoming 
a monk at the Monastery of Saints Jason and Sosipater in August 146812. He 
will remain in this monastery until his death sometime after 1477, when his 
chronicle ends13. During the 16th century, the Metropolitan of Monemvasia, 
Makarios Melissenos (? – 1585), edited and interpolated the original text, 
modifying and adding sections. The result was a completely different version 
of the original work known as Chronicon Maius14.
Sphrantzes participated in several diplomatic missions and held 
various government positions during the last three decades before the Fall. 
We would, therefore, expect that an experienced diplomat, such as he, would 
reveal enough information about the Council of Union in Italy, as it was 
the culmination of the established foreign policy of the last Palaeologan 
emperors. The author does not mention, however, nothing more on the 
Council beyond the date of departure and return of the Byzantine delegation 
and the death of Patriarch Joseph II (1416–1439) and of another Orthodox 
7. M. hinterBerGer, Autobiographische Traditionen in Byzanz [WBS 22], Vienna 1999, 
116-121, 331-343.  
8. Sfranze, Cronaca, X, 1-2: 22.1-9.
9. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXI, 2: 68.25-26.
10. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXVI, 7: 94.20-21.
11. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXV, 9: 134.1-6.
12. Sfranze, Cronaca, XLV, 3: 182.25-26. The choice of Sphrantzes to stay at this 
monastery resulted in all probability to the fact that his spiritual father, a monk named 
Dorotheos, fled there together with other Byzantine officials and aristocrats after the Fall (M. 
anGold, Memoirs, confessions and apologies: the last chapter of Byzantine autobiography, 
BMGS 37:2 (2013), 212 [hereafter: anGold, Memoirs, confessions and apologies).  
13. Sfranze, Cronaca, XLVIII, 1-4: 194.1-196.4.
14. On the Chronicon Maius and related bibliography, see PhiliPPides – hanaK, The 
Siege and the Fall, 146-151; KarPozilos, Βυζαντινοί Ιστορικοί και Χρονογράφοι, 580-588.
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hierarch in Italy15. This is understandable since Sphrantzes was then serving 
the despot, and later emperor Constantine Palaeologus when Byzantine and 
Latin diplomats were working to organize the Council of Union. For this 
reason, he played no part in the negotiations that led to its convening. It is 
also known that he was not included in the large Byzantine delegation that 
participated in the Council16. It is reasonable, therefore, to record nothing 
more on an issue in which he had no involvement, even indirect, limiting 
himself to the calendar entry of the departure and return of the Byzantine 
delegation from Italy17.
This, however, did not prevent him from expressing his sharp criticism 
against the policy adopted by Emperor John VIII towards the Union of the 
Churches18. This criticism unfolds in response to the objections he expressed 
towards the Council, which he characterizes as unnecessary19. Sphrantzes 
hastens, however, to clarify that he does not disagree with the convening 
of such a council on account of dogmatic criteria, his objections remaining 
on the fact that this council provoked Ottoman aggression20. The author’s 
stance stems from the fact that he is unable to understand the significance 
and function of the dogmatic differences of the two Christian traditions. 
15. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXIII, 1: 80. 1-5; XXIV, 4: 86.15-19.
16. Although Sphrantzes provides no autobiographical information for the time during 
which the Council convened beyond the birth of his eldest son (Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙV, 2: 
86. 6-7), it is clear that he remained in Constantinople near Constantine Palaeologus, who 
had assumed the duties of regent until John VIII returned from Italy.  
17. It should be noted, however, that the author of Chronicon Maius makes an extensive 
account of the arrival of the Byzantine delegation in Venice and then in Ferrara immediately 
after the recording of the departure of the Byzantine mission to Italy. (Pseudo-Phrantzes: 
Macarie Melissenos, Chronica 1258-1481, ed. V. GreCu, Georgios Sphrantzes, Memorii 
1401-1477 [Scriptores Byzantini V], Bucureşti 1966, XIII, 13 – XVI, 5: 322.13 – 332.5). 
It is quite possible that the author used at this point an unknown but definitely related 
source to the Chronicle of Pseudo-Dorotheos [e. n. amoiridou, Η editio princeps (1577) των 
Ελληνικών Πρακτικών της Συνόδου Φερράρας – Φλωρεντίας: Περιγραφή – Διάδοση – 
Επιβίωση, Thessaloniki 2012, 94-95; KarPozilos, Βυζαντινοί Ιστορικοί και Χρονογράφοι, 
584-586].  
18. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ: 80, 4 – 86, 2. 
19. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 1: 80.4-5: ...διὰ τὴν μελετηθεῖσαν (ὡς μὴ ὤφελε) σύνοδον. 
20. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 2: 80.6: Καὶ οὐ λέγω τοῦτο διὰ τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας 
δόγματα... See also n. 27 and 64 below.
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Doctrinal differences are treated by him as specialized aspects of religious 
faith that can be judged only by clerics and expert theologians, who have the 
necessary training and knowledge21. What is important for the author is the 
fact that the Orthodox doctrine is an element of his own cultural heritage 
that he received from his forefathers and no one can deny either its antiquity 
or its good effect22. However, no one can dispute the similar character of 
the Latin doctrine23. The evidence of dogmatic heterogeneity of the two 
Christian traditions is nothing more than alternative ways of approaching 
the common Christian truth, as implied by the allegorical story of the 
alternative access roads to the Church of Hagia Sophia that follows in his 
historical narration24. Nevertheless, Sphrantzes points out that he chooses to 
remain faithful to the tradition he has received and is more familiar to him, 
without opposing anyone who chooses to join the Latin doctrine25. He also 
points out that he does not oppose the prospect of ecclesiastical union, for 
which he declares that he is ready to sacrifice even one of his eyes26.
Despite Sphrantzes is ready to sacrifice even one of his eyes for the 
sake of the union of the Churches, he completely disagrees with the decision 
of John VIII Palaeologus to participate in this specific council of Union. 
He believes that the Byzantine participation in such a council was a wrong 
political move, as it provoked Ottoman aggression and consequently the 
violent overthrow of the Empire27. The author, in other words, believes that 
21. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 2: 80.6-7: ...ταῦτα γὰρ παρ’ ἄλλοις ἐδόθησαν κρίνεσθαι .
22. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 2: 80.7-9: ... ἐμοὶ δ’ ἀρκεῖ ἡ πατρική μου διαδοχὴ τῆς 
πίστεως, καὶ ὅτι οὐδέποτε παρά τινος τῶν τοῦ μέρους ἐκείνου ἤκουσα ὅτι τὸ ἡμῶν κακόν, 
ἀλλὰ καλὸν καὶ ἀρχαῖον...  
23. Sfranze, Cronaca ΧΧΙΙΙ, 2: 80.9-10: ... καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων οὐ κακόν, ἀλλὰ καλόν.  
24. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 3: 80.11-23.  
25. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 3: 80.19-23: ... μετ’ εἰρήνης καὶ ἀγάπης ἀπέρχεσθε καλῶς 
εἰς τὴν Ἁγίαν Σοφίαν ὁπόθεν βούλεσθε· ἐγὼ δὲ πάλιν θέλω διέρχεσθαι διὰ τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἣν 
καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν πολύν τινα χρόνον διηρχόμην καὶ καλὴν αὐτὴν καὶ παρ’ ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν 
προγόνων μου μαρτυρουμένην καὶ διερχομένην .  
26. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 4: 80.26-27: ... ἤθελα γὰρ νὰ εἶχε γενεῖν καλῶς ἕνωσις 
τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν καὶ νά με ἔλειπεν ὁ εἷς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μου ...  
27. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧIΙΙ, 4: 80.26-29: … ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ὅτι ἦν καὶ αὕτη ἡ τῆς 
συνόδου δουλεία αἰτία μία καὶ πρώτη καὶ μεγάλη εἰς τὸ νὰ γένηται ἡ κατὰ τῆς Πόλεως 
τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἔφοδος καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτην πάλιν ἡ πολιορκία καὶ ἡ αἰχμαλωσία καὶ τοιαύτη 
καὶ τοσαύτη συμφορὰ ἡμῶν. See also notes 20 and 64.
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the Ottomans took the proclaimed unity as an act of provocation that forced 
them to preemptively strike Constantinople, before the Holy See would urge 
the European powers to assist militarily the Byzantine authorities against 
them, after overcoming the issue of division between the two Churches. This 
view is justified by the relevant advice that Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus 
gave to his son and future successor on how to act on the issue of Church 
union.
The advice is presented by Sphrantzes through a discussion that the old 
emperor had with the then young co-emperor, John VIII Palaeologus, in the 
presence of the author28. It is not known whether this discussion is a literary 
invention of Sphrantzes, to capture his thoughts, or whether it is a discussion 
that actually took place at some point between the two men. If the two men 
had such a conversation, it took place at some point after the unfortunate 
attempt by young John to oppose the rise of Murad II (1421 – 1444 and 1446 
– 1451) to the Ottoman throne (1421), despite his father’s reservations29. 
Based on this evidence, it has been argued that this discussion took place 
during the autumn of 1422, when the papal envoy Antonio da Massa (? -1435) 
was in Constantinople promoting the unification negotiations30. Emperor 
28. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙIΙ, 5-6: 82.1-15.  
29. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙIΙ, 7: 82.25-27: ... προεῖδον γὰρ καὶ τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτοῦ 
καὶ τὰ ἐδόξαζε κατορθῶσαι μὲ τὸν Μουσταφᾶν, καὶ εἶδον καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν κατορθωμάτων 
εἰς τί κίνδυνον μᾶς ἔφερον. On this issue, see s. ÇeliK, Manuel II Palaiologos (1350–1425). 
A Byzantine Emperor in a Time of Tumult, New York 2021, 355 ff [hereafter: ÇeliK, Manuel 
II Palaiologos].  
30. J.w. BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A study in Late Byzantine 
Statesmanship, New Brunswick – New Jersey 1969, 329-331 [hereafter: BarKer, Manuel II 
Palaeologus]· Ch. dendrinos, Reflections on the failure of the Union of Florence, Annuarium 
Historiae Conciliorum 39 (2007), 123; ÇeliK, Manuel II Palaiologos, 361. On the mission 
of Antonio da Massa to Constantinople during the autumn of 1422, see V. laurent, Les 
preliminaires du concile de Florence: Les neuf articles du pape Martin V et la réponse 
du patriarche Joseph II (Octobre 1422), REB 20 (1962), 10-23 [hereafter: laurent, Les 
préliminaires]; J. Gill, The Council of Florence, Cambridge 1959, 33-36 [hereafter: Gill, The 
Council of Florence]; BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus, 327-329; K.m. setton, The Papacy 
and the Levant (1204-1571) [Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society 127], v. II: The 
Fifteenth Century, Philadelphia 1978, 42-44 [hereafter: setton, The Papacy and the Levant]; 
N.D. saVVoPoulos, Ανατολή και Δύση στην τελευταία τους συνάντηση. Η σύγκληση της 
Συνόδου Φερράρας – Φλωρεντίας [Βυζαντινή Γραμματεία 10], Athens 2009, 143-154 
[hereafter: saVVoPoulos, Ανατολή και Δύση].  
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Manuel II, who was his main interlocutor, was confined to bed after a stroke 
that left him partly paralyzed just two weeks after the envoy’s arrival31. 
Thus, the papal envoy met with John the VIII, who, together with Patriarch 
Joseph II, requested that the unification negotiations be postponed32. It 
seems, therefore, that the formation of the Byzantine authorities’ response 
to Antonio da Massa was the reason for this discussion.
Manuel II advises John to raise the issue of an ecclesiastical union from 
time to time, especially when he needs to intimidate the Ottomans, as the 
latter believed that the Holy See would urge European forces to campaign 
against them in the event of a union of the Orthodox Church with the Roman 
Catholic33. At the same time, however, he advised him never to materialize 
this ecclesiastical union, as the Byzantine Churchmen would never accept 
to be united with the Latin Church as long as it refused to return to the pre-
Schismatic state34. The denial of the Byzantine clergy to comply with the 
imposed imperial principles on Church unity would cause “worse division” 
(χεῖρον σχίσμα) and conflict among his subjects at a critical moment for 
the survival of the Empire35. This advice displeased the future monarch, who 
silently left the room, prompting the rather interesting comment from the 
old emperor that his successor could not comprehend that the Empire was 
31. Memoirs of Sylvester Syropoulos, ed. V. laurent, Les “Memoires” du Grand 
Ecclésiarque de l’Église de Constantinople Sylvestre Syropoulos sur le concile de Florence 
(1438-1439) [Concilium Florentinum Documenta et Scriptores, series B, vol. IX], Roma 
1971, II, 11: 112. 17-19 [hereafter: Syropoulos, Memoires]: Ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς περιπέπτωκε 
νοσήματι ἡμιπληξίας, ἔτι παρόντος ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Ἀντωνίου, καὶ ἔκειτο νοσῶν ἐπὶ τρεῖς 
ἔγγιστα ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ ἐγένετο ἐγκρατὴς τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ βασιλεὺς κὺρ Ἰωάννης 
ὁ Παλαιολόγος… On Manuel’s illness, see ÇeliK, Manuel II Palaiologos, 359.
32. laurent, Les préliminaires, 10-23·  Gill, The Council of Florence, 35; setton, The 
Papacy and the Levant, 42; saVVoPoulos, Ανατολή και Δύση, 152, 155.  
33. Sfranze, Cronaca, XΧΧΙΙ, 5: 82.4-8: ...υἱέ μου, βεβαίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα 
ἐκ μέσης τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν δὴ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ὅτι πολλὰ τοὺς φοβεῖ, μὴ συμφωνήσωμεν καὶ 
ἑνωθῶμεν μὲ τοὺς Φράγκους· ἔχουν το γὰρ ὅτι, ἂν τοῦτο γένηται, θέλει γενεῖν μέγα τι 
κακὸν εἰς αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν τῆς Δύσεως Χριστιανῶν δι’ ἡμᾶς.  
34. Sfranze, Cronaca, XΧΧΙΙ, 6: 82.10-13: ... τὸ δὲ νὰ ποιήσῃς αὐτήν, μηδὲν 
ἐπιχειρισθῇς αὐτό, διότι οὐδὲν βλέπω τοὺς ἡμετέρους ὅτι εἰσὶν ἁρμόδιοι πρὸς τὸ εὑρεῖν 
τινα τρόπον ἑνώσεως καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας, ἀλλ’ ὅτι νὰ τοὺς ἐπιστρέψουν εἰς τὸ νά 
ἐσμεν ὡς ἀρχῆθεν.  
35. Sfranze, Cronaca, XΧΧΙΙ, 6: 82.13-15: Τούτου δὲ ἀδύνατον ὄντος σχεδόν, 
φοβοῦμαι μὴ καὶ χεῖρον σχίσμα γένηται, καὶ ἰδοὺ ἀπεσκεπάσθημεν εἰς τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς.  
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in such a state that it no longer needed an emperor (βασιλεύς) but a steward 
(οἰκονόμος)36. 
Emperor Manuel II’s advice to his young co-emperor on how to handle 
the issue of ecclesiastical union with the West essentially sums up the policy 
pursued by him on this issue. The pre-eminent objective of Manuel II’s 
diplomacy does not differ essentially from that of his father, Emperor John 
V, which looked to western help for the survival of the Empire37. For this 
reason, Manuel II embarked on a long and arduous journey to the most 
important courts of Western Europe, personally soliciting for military 
assistance against the Ottoman threat38. The Emperor, however, avoided 
during the long tour in the western courtyards, to put the question for 
the union of the two Churches, something that had been unsuccessfully 
attempted by his predecessor39. This, of course, makes an impression, given 
that Manuel had previously been involved in such negotiations with the Holy 
See in an attempt to protect Thessaloniki from the Ottoman threat during 
its rule by him (1382-1387)40. Apparently, the unsuccessful development of 
36. Sfranze, Cronaca, XΧΧΙΙ, 7: 82.16-22: Τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως, ὡς ἔδοξε, μὴ δεξαμένου 
τὸν λόγον τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ, μηδὲν εἰπών, ἀναστὰς ἀπῆλθε. καὶ μικρὸν σύννους γεγονὼς 
ὁ μακαρίτης καὶ ἀοίδιμος πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, ἐμβλέψας πρὸς ἐμὲ ὁρίζει· « ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ υἱός μου 
ἔνι μὲν ἁρμόδιος βασιλεύς, οὐ τοῦ παρόντος δὲ καιροῦ. βλέπει γὰρ καὶ φρονεῖ μεγάλα καὶ 
τοιαῦτα, οἷα οἱ καιροὶ ἔχρῃζον τῆς εὐημερίας τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν. ἀμὴ σήμερον, ὡς ἂν 
παρακολουθοῦσιν εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ βασιλέα θέλει ἡ ἡμῶν ἀρχή, ἀλλ’ οἰκονόμον... . 
37. On the aims and expectations of the policy adopted by John V Palaeologus on 
this issue, see V. Varmazi – nerantzi, Το Βυζάντιο και η Δύση (1354–1369). Συμβολή 
στην ιστορία των πρώτων χρόνων της μονοκρατορίας του Ιωάννη Ε΄ Παλαιολόγου, 
Thessaloniki 1993; osK. haleCKi, Un empereur de Byzance à Rome: vingt ans de travail pour 
l’union des églises et pour la défence del’Empire d’Orient, 1355–1375 [Travaux historiques 
de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie 3], Warszawa 1930; J. Gill, Byzantium 
and the Papacy 1198-1400, New Jersey 1979, 208-229. For the policy pursued by Manuel 
II Palaeologus on this issue, see BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus, 123-385; J. harris, The 
End of Byzantium, New Haven 2010, 46-102 [hereafter: harris, The End of Byzantium]; 
fl. leonte, Imperial Visions of Late Byzantium. Manuel II Palaiologos and Rhetoric in 
Purple, Edinburgh 2020, 242-243 [hereafter: leonte, Imperial Visions]; ÇeliK, Manuel II 
Palaiologos, 238 ff.  
38. BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus, 123-385; harris, The End of Byzantium, 46-102; 
ÇeliK, Manuel II Palaiologos, 238 ff.  
39. BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus, 330-331; ÇeliK, Manuel II Palaiologos, 213 ff.
40. For the negotiations in which the Manuel had been involved as governor of 
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these negotiations forced the then young Manuel to realize the problems and 
weaknesses of such a policy41. He, moreover, possessed sound theological 
knowledge that enabled him to refute the Latin beliefs42 as can be seen, inter 
alios, from the lengthy treatise on the procession of the Holy Spirit he wrote 
during his stay in the French capital in response to a Latin tract on the same 
subject presented to him by an anonymous Latin scholar43. Nevertheless, 
Manuel did not rule out the possibility of restoring ecclesiastical unity with 
the Latin tradition, when ecclesiastical and theological people in Paris asked 
him about this. Even then, however, he sets a precondition for the convening 
of a joint ecclesiastical council, where the disputed issues would be discussed 
in an atmosphere of sincerity and free theological dialogue44.
Later, however, he decided to raise again the issue of ecclesiastical 
union, with the obvious expectation that only in this way would he be able 
to secure the support of the Holy See for the organizing of a crusade against 
the Ottomans. This effort became more complicated by the Great Schism 
that had plagued the Latin Church since 137845. The simultaneous presence 
of two elected popes, one in Rome and one in Avignon, were problematic 
since the western kingdoms were divided by the recognition of one of the 
two papal authorities46. Nevertheless, Emperor Manuel II did not hesitate to 
Thessaloniki, see G.T. dennis, The Reign of Manuel II Palaeologus in Thessalonica, 1382-
1387 [OCA 159], Roma 1960, 132-150; ÇeliK, Manuel II Palaiologos, 107. 
41. BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus, 330; ÇeliK, Manuel II Palaiologos, 107. 
42. For a comprehensive presentation of the theological writing activity of Manuel 
II Palaeologus, see S. lamProu, Ο αυτοκράτωρ Μανουήλ Β΄ Παλαιολόγος ως θεολόγος. 
Συμβολή στην Παλαιολόγεια Γραμματεία, Thessaloniki 2011.  
43. Ch. dendrinos, An annotated critical edition (editio princeps) of Emperor Manuel 
II Palaeologus’ treatise ‘On the Procession of the Holy Spirit’, PhD thesis, Royal Holloway, 
University of London, 1996. On this treatise of Emperor Manuel II, see ÇeliK, Manuel II 
Palaiologos, 234 ff.
44. Ch. dendrinos, Manuel II Palaeologus in Paris (1400–1402): Theology, Diplomacy, 
and Politics, in: Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History, 1204-1500, eds m. hinterBerGer 
– Ch. sChaBel [Bibliotheca 11], Leuven – Paris – Walpole, MA 2011, 409 ff; ÇeliK, Manuel 
II Palaiologos, 240-242.
45. m.a. ryan, Byzantium, Islam, and the Great Western Schism, in: A Companion 
to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417), eds J. rollo-Koster & th. m. izBiCKi [Brill’s 
companions to the Christian tradition 17], Leiden – Boston 2009, 201 ff.  
46. For the Great Schism that afflicted the Roman Catholic Church between the years 
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make this request initially to Pope Innocent VII (1404–1406)47 and then at 
the Council of Constance (1414–1418)48. Even then, however, he did not show 
the slightest intention to accept the subjugation of the Byzantine Church 
to the Latin Church, as was persistently demanded by the Pope. Instead, 
Emperor Manuel II counter proposed that ecclesiastical union could only 
come from convening a joint Church council where controversial issues 
would be discussed in an honest climate and free theological dialogue49. In 
this way, the Emperor harmonized with the Byzantine ecclesiastical circles, 
which, united around the Patriarchate, persistently rejected, throughout the 
late Byzantine period, any plan of a union that would not be based on free 
and open Christian discourse on equal terms50. These circles were convinced 
that the Latins would undoubtedly be persuaded by the Orthodox teachings 
and interpretation of the Scriptural and Patristic evidence and would 
return to the state of the Church before the Schism51. Such a possibility, 
however, seemed quite unlike since the Holy See persistently refused to 
discuss any point of its dogmatic position and ecclesiastical supremacy52. 
Thus, a possible ecclesiastical union could only take place under political 
pressure, which would inevitably provoke the reaction of most clergymen, 
1378-1417, see the studies included in the volume: A Companion to the Great Western 
Schism (1378–1417) [as in previous note].
47. G.t. dennis, Official documents of Manuel II Palaeologus, Byz. 41 (1971), no 23.  
48. r.-J. loenertz, Les dominicains byzantins Théodore et Andrè Chrysoberges et les 
négociations pour l’union des églises grecque et latine de 1415-1430, Archivum Fratrum 
Praedicatorum 9 (1939), 23-29; J. Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198-1400, 20-21; 
setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 39-41.  
49. J. BooJamra, The Byzantine notion of the “Ecumenical Council” in the Fourteenth 
Century”, BZ 80:1, 72 ff [hereafter: The Byzantine notion].
50. ar. PaPadaKis – J. meyendorff, The Christian East and the rise of the Papacy. 
The Church 1071-1453 A.D. [The Church in History IV], Crestwood, NY 1994, 385-386 
[hereafter: PaPadaKis – meyendorff, The Christian East].  
51. leonte, Imperial Visions, 42-45. It is remarkable what is written by the patriarch 
Neilos Kerameas (1380-1388) to Pope Urban VI (1378-1389), in September 1384, regarding 
this issue: … καὶ ἡμεῖς γὰρ λίαν ἀποδεχόμεθα τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν, 
πλὴν ἵνα γένηται, καθὼς θέλει ὁ Θεὸς καὶ καθὼς ἧν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ σχίσματος ... (MM II, 87).
52. On the Papacy’s denial of the Byzantine proposal to convene a general council 
to discuss the differences between the two Churches, see PaPadaKis – meyendorff, The 
Christian East, 385-389.  
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including monastics, who would vigorously oppose such an effort and call 
on the faithful to reject it at all costs. In this way, internal unity would 
be disrupted in such a critical moment, as it actually happened after the 
convening of the Ferrara-Florence Council53.
Nevertheless, John VIII persistently insisted on the necessity of a joint 
ecclesiastical council, as he knew that the prospect of the Union of the 
Churches terrified the Ottomans54. Although modern Ottoman sources make 
no mention of these negotiations and the dangers posed to their state, it is 
clear that the Ottomans realized that their successful outcome would lead 
to the organization of a crusade against them55. This is evident mainly from 
the relevant testimony of the anonymous author of an Ottoman chronicle 
describing the Hungarian-Turkish wars of 1443-144456. The unknown author 
presents Emperor John VIII agreeing with the Pope to organize a crusade 
against the Ottomans at the Council of Ferrara - Florence, which according 
to him, was the cause of the Hungarian-Turkish wars that followed57. The 
observations of the Ottoman chronicler allow us to interpret the Ottoman 
reactions caused by the participation of the Byzantines in the Council. 
These reactions also handed down by Sylvestros Syropoulos, range from the 
Ottoman counter-proposals for financial support to the thought of a siege 
53. On the popular reactions in Constantinople to the signing of the Florentine decree 
by the Byzantine delegation, see G.E. demaCoPoulos, The popular reception of the Council of 
Florence in Constantinople 1439-1453, St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 43 (1999), 37-53. 
54. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 5-6: 82.4-11: …υἱέ μου, βεβαίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα 
ἐκ μέσης τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν δὴ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ὅτι πολλὰ τοὺς φοβεῖ, μὴ συμφωνήσωμεν 
καὶ ἑνωθῶμεν μὲ τοὺς Φράγκους· ἔχουν το γὰρ ὅτι, ἂν τοῦτο γένηται, θέλει γενεῖν μέγα 
τι κακὸν εἰς αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν τῆς Δύσεως Χριστιανῶν δι’ ἡμᾶς. Λοιπὸν τὸ περὶ τῆς 
συνόδου, μελέτα μὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνακάτωνε, καὶ μάλισθ’ ὅταν ἔχεις χρείαν τινὰ φοβῆσαι 
τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς.  
55. el. a. zaChariadou, The Ottomans, the Greek Orthodox Church and the perils 
of the Papacy, in: Sylvester Syropoulos on Politics and Culture in the Fifteenth-Century 
Mediterranean. Themes and Problems in the Memoirs, Section IV, eds f. Kondyli – V. 
andrioPoulou – eir. Panou – m.B. CunninGham [Birmingham Byzantine and Ottoman 
Studies 16], Farnham – Burlington 2014, 23-29 [hereafter: zaChariadou, The Ottomans, the 
Greek Orthodox Church and the perils].  
56. For this chronicle, see Το Χρονικό των Ουγγροτουρκικών Πολέμων (1443-
1444), Greek trans. G. aiVali – el. zaChariadou – ant. XanthinaKis, Herakleio 2005, 23 ff. 
57. Χρονικό των Ουγγροτουρκικών Πολέμων [as in previous note], 88-91.  
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of Constantinople58. These reactions were intended, without succeeding, 
discourage and prevent the Byzantines from actively pursuing the success 
of the union at the Council59.
The advice of the elderly emperor displeased young John, who departed 
in deep thought and silence from this meeting. The future Emperor actively 
invested in the union of the Churches to secure military assistance from 
the Latin West. For this reason, his diplomatic activity focused almost 
exclusively on the issue of the union of the Churches, thus continuing 
the initiative that had been inaugurated by his father at the Council of 
Constance. According to Joseph Gill, who devoted much of his research in 
studying in detail the Council of Ferrara-Florence from a Roman Catholic 
perspective, the unifying efforts of John VIII, in contrast to those of his 
predecessor, are driven by a real zeal to bridge the gap between the two 
Christian traditions60. The growing Ottoman pressure, moreover, leave 
him no other option, especially after the disappointing expectation for 
military help from Venice and mainly from Hungary61. The particular 
conditions prevailing in the Latin Church after the Great Schism (1378 
–1417) particularly favored the emperor’s unifying efforts, allowing him 
to negotiate for the first time on equal terms. This was based on discord 
that divided the Latin Church between defenders of papal supremacy and 
conciliarists in the 15th century. Both Pope Martin IV (1417–1431) and his 
successor, Eugene IV (1431–1447), in contrast to their predecessors, had 
been restricted in their jurisdiction and consequently the Byzantine plan for 
convening a general council to discuss the important problem of Christian 
division was no longer considered undesired or indeed unattainable62. The 
58. Syropoulos, Μemoires, ΙΙΙ, 21: 182, 14-16. Let us also note that Doukas gives 
relevant information with the difference, that the emperor John VIII sought, according to 
him, to reassure the Ottoman concerns just after returning from Italy, and thus he sent to the 
Sultan a delegation assuring him that the Emperor’s trip to Italy was not aimed at organizing 
a crusade against them, but at resolving dogmatic differences with the Roman Catholics 
(Ducas, Istoria Turco-Byzantină, ΧΧΧΙ, 8: 269. 22-29).  
59. zaChariadou, The Ottomans, the Greek Orthodox Church and the perils, 24.  
60. Gill, The Council of Florence, 88, n. 2.  
61. D.m. Nicol, The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453, Cambridge University 
Press, 21993, 351 ff.  
62. BooJamra, The Byzantine notion, 72 ff.  
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persistent Byzantine demand for the convening of an ecumenical council 
was finally accepted, and Emperor John VIIΙ took part in the works, playing 
an important role in persuading the Byzantine delegation to sign the Decree 
of Union, with the notable exception of Mark Eugenikos (ca 1392–1444), 
who refused to add his signature thus becoming the champion of the anti-
unionist party, as well as George Scholarios (ca 1400 – ca 1472), Georgios 
Gemistos (ca 1355–1452) and Demetrius Palaeologus (1407–1470), who had 
left Florence soon after the death of Patriarch Joseph (10.VI.1439), in order 
to avoid signing the Decree63.
According to Sphrantzes, Emperor Manuel II believed that the suc- 
cessful completion of the negotiations on the Union of Churches would 
provoke Ottoman aggression because the Ottomans would take the union 
of the Churches as a provocative and disconcerting move, leading to a 
preemptive strike against Constantinople before the arrival of any sizable help 
from the West64. That is why Manuel II advises John VIII to raise the issue of 
union in case of danger, but never to proceed with the union negotiations65. 
Sphrantzes, in particular, insists on confirming the correctness of this 
advice, recording how Sultan Murad II reacted when he was informed that 
Emperor John VIII intended to proceed with the unification negotiations 
and to participate in a unification council in Italy. The author describes 
in some detail both the sultan’s cunning counterproposal for financial aid 
towards the emperor, even in private affairs, provided that he canceled his 
participation in the council and as well as the Ottoman plans for the siege 
of Constantinople, for a forced return of the emperor from Italy66. Similar 
63. For the role played by Emperor John VIII Palaiologos in the Council, see J. Gill, 
John VIII Palaeologus. A Character Study, in: Silloge byzantina in onore di Silvio Giuseppe 
Mercati [SBN 9], Rome 1957, 152-170; S. Kolditz, Johannes VIII. Palaiologos und das 
Konzil von Ferrara – Florenz (1438/39): das byzantinische Kaisertum im Dialog mit dem 
Westen [Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 60], v. I, Stuttgart 2013, 286 ff; J. 
n.Van siCKle, Re-evaluating the Role of Emperor John VIII in the Failed Union of Florence, 
The Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 68:1 (2017), 49-54.  
64. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 5: 82. 4-8 cited in n. 54 See also n. 20 and 27.
65. Sfranze, Cronaca ΧΧΙΙΙ, 6: 82. 9-11 cited in n. 54. 
66. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 8: 82. 1-7: … ὡς ἐστάθη, ἵνα ἀπέλθη εἰς τὴν σύνοδον, 
ἐστάλη εἰς τὸν ἀμηρᾶν ἀποκρισιάριος Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ Ἴαγρος δηλῶσαι τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνον 
ὡς τάχα φίλον καὶ ἀδελφόν. κἀκεῖνος ἀπελογήσατο, ὅτι· «οὐδέν μοι φαίνεται καλὸν νὰ 
ὑπάγῃ νὰ κοπιάσῃ τοσοῦτον καὶ νὰ ἐξοδιάσῃ· καὶ τί νὰ κερδίσῃ; ἰδοὺ ἐγώ, καὶ ἐὰν ἔχῃ 
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information arises from the memoirs of Sylvester Syropoulos67. This evidence 
not only confirms the credibility of Sphrantzes but strongly supports the 
basis of his arguments, as it is very likely that he recorded events that were 
pretty much known mainly in the court officials who probably were the 
audience he had in mind when he wrote his chronicle.
The decision of Emperor John VIII to participate in a council of Union 
is interpreted by Sphrantzes as lack of political realism on his part. This 
interpretation is expressed through the rather interesting comment made 
by his father-Emperor after John departed from the discussion on how to 
handle the vital issue of the ecclesiastical union. Manuel II considers that his 
successor was unable to realize that the Empire is now in such a state that 
no longer –as already stated– needs an emperor (βασιλεύς) but a steward 
(οἰκονόμος)68. The difference between an emperor and a steward lies in the 
perception by the elderly emperor of the degree of independence they had, 
to implement their decisions69. The awareness of the limited possibilities 
that his successor had, in his opinion, is an example of political realism that 
characterized him, as his advice for a policy of fine diplomatic balances 
towards both the Ottomans and the West perceived as mutual deterrents. 
The Emperor Manuel II is presented as a wise monarch that embodies the 
standard of an Orthodox and pragmatic ruler who was convinced that the 
χρείαν καὶ ἀσπρῶν δι’ ἔξοδον καὶ εἰσόδημα καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς θεραπείαν αὐτοῦ, ἕτοιμός 
εἰμι νὰ τὸν θεραπεύσω.  
67. Syropoulos, Μemoires, ΙΙΙ, 21: 182. 11-16: Τοῦ γὰρ Ἀσὰν κῦρ Παύλου πρέσβεως 
σταλέντος τότε πρὸς τὸν Ἀμυρᾶν, εἶπον αὐτῷ οἱ βεζήριδες· Τί ἔνι τὸ κατεπεῖγον τὸν 
βασιλέα καὶ ἀπέρχεται πρὸς τοὺς Λατίνους; Εἰ ἔχει τινὰ ἀνάγκην, εἰπάτω ταύτην, καὶ ὁ 
αὐθέντης θεραπεύσει ταύτην· κρείττονα θεραπείαν εὑρήσει ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐθέντου παρὰ ἀπὸ 
τῶν Λατίνων, καὶ πλέον συμφέρει τῷ βασιλεῖ ἡ φιλία τοῦ Ἀμυρᾶ ἤπερ ἡ τῶν Λατίνων. 
Παραιτησάσθω οὖν τὴν πρὸς Λατίνους ἀποδημίαν καὶ εὑρήσει ὅπερ ἄν ζητήσῃ παρὰ 
τοῦ αὐθέντου. Let it be noted, also, that Doucas notes a respective delegation to the Sultan 
but after the return of the emperor from Italy (Ducas, Istoria Turco-Byzantină, XXXI, 8: 
269.22-29).  
68. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 7: 82 16-22 cited in n. 36.
69. T. KiousoPoulou, Βασιλεύς ή Οικονόμος. Πολιτική εξουσία και ιδεολογία πριν 
την Άλωση, Αθήνα 2007, 187-188 [hereafter: KiousoPoulou, Βασιλεύς ή Οικονόμος]. For a 
different interpretation of Manuel II’s words on the basis of management of public finances, 
see K.–P. matsChKe, Die Schlacht bei Ankara und das Schicksal von Byzanz. Studien zur 
spätbyzantinischen Geschichte zwischen 1402 und 1422, Weimar 1981, 220 ff. 
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survival of the Empire can only be accomplished solely by maintaining the 
balance of power, both externally and internally. This required on one hand 
good knowledge of western politics and ecclesiastical power and priorities 
as well Ottoman plans and insecurities, and on the other hand the realities, 
divisions and prospects within Byzantine Church and society. He understood, 
therefore, that the repeated calls for the Ecumenical Council of Union were 
the only way to secure balance and valuable time in international politics. 
At the same time he was well aware that this issue, if it progressed, could 
become a major cause of discord among his subjects at a critical time for 
the survival of the Empire. For this reason, skillful diplomatic manoeuvres 
were required to secure or at least prolong the future of the Empire. These 
diplomatic manoeuvres could only be successfully carried out by a prudent 
and realistic statesman, such as Manuel II, but not by a monarch who 
would lack grasp the harsh realities and pursued an ambitious plan for the 
restoration of the former prestige of the Empire, such as John VIII.
The latter opted for this very reason to defy the advice of his 
experienced father-Emperor and proceed with the unifying negotiations. 
This option however overturned balances that had been achieved thanks 
to the intelligent and diplomatic manipulations of his predecessor, causing 
the violent fall of the Empire sixteen years later. The repeated appeals of 
Emperor Manuel II for the convening of a unifying council brought about 
the Ferrara – Florence Council only because his young and inexperienced 
son and successor avoided maintaining these balances. According to 
Sphrantzes, this is explained by the fact that Emperor John VIII was unable 
to realize the limited possibilities he had. The political choices, therefore, of 
Emperor John VIII are ultimately those that caused the Fall and not those 
of his predecessor. In this way, however, Sphrantzes dispenses Emperor 
Manuel II from any criticism he may have received on his unifying policy or 
from those Byzantine aristocrats and officials who had taken refuge in the 
West after the Fall70. The responsibility is now shifted to Emperor John VIII, 
70. anGold, Memoirs, confessions and apologies, 213. It should also be noted that 
the author tries to clear the memory of Constantine XI Palaeologus from such accusations 
with quite a touching note which exaggerates the agonized efforts of the last emperor for 
the salvation of the besieged Constantinople and shifts the responsibility for the Fall to 
the European and Balkan forces who did not care to provide military assistance when was 
desperately needed [Sfranze, Cronaca, XXVI, 1-14: 136.6-142.14].  
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who insisted that the unification negotiations proceed in a way that suited 
the old prestige of the imperial institution rather than the bitter reality71.
The union was finally proclaimed, with virtually no tangible results, 
apart from that campaign that ended in the defeat of Varna (1444)72.Τhe 
declared union did not provide any substantial assistance to besieged 
Constantinople. Sphrantzes points out with particular rigor that the 
Christians of other countries did little to help Constantinople, ignoring even 
the dangers that layed ahead for them if Constantinople eventually fell to the 
Ottomans73. The first on his list is the Despot of Serbia, Djuradj Branković 
(1377–1456), who did not refuse to act as an intermediary in the peace 
agreement between the Hungarians and the Turks, although that would have 
at least delayed the attack on Constantinople74. The Serbian Despot did not 
realize that once the head is removed, the limbs perish too. Not even the 
Venetians helped, particularly due to Francesco Foscari (1373–1457), who 
had personal motives75. There was also no help from the Church of Rome, 
despite the fact that the Union had been officially proclaimed almost six 
months before the Fall76. But neither the Εmperor of Trebizond nor the 
ruler of Georgia were willing to help the besieged Constantinople77. The 
Hungarians only seem to have intimidated the Ottomans but to no avail78. 
If someone really fought for the salvation of besieged Constantinople, it 
was none other than the Emperor Constantine XI Palaeologus who made 
every effort to secure military aid against the Ottomans79. Even parts of his 
territory were willing to cede to foreign rulers on the condition of providing 
aid against the Ottomans80. However God overheard due to human chariots 
71. anGold, Memoirs, confessions and apologies, 213.  
72. For the crusade of Varna, see m. chasiN, The Crusade of  Varna, in: A History of the 
Crusades, v. 6: The Impact of the Crusades in Europe, eds K.Μ. setton – h.w. hazard – n. 
P. zaCour, Wisconsin 1989, 276-310. 
73. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 2-9: 136.9-140.19.  
74. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 2: 136. 9-17. 
75. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 3-4: 136. 18 – 138.10.
76. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 5-6: 138. 11-26. 
77. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 8: 140.6-8.
78. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 9: 140.9-19.
79. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 10-14: 140.20 – 142.16. 
80. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 11-12: 140.24 – 142.5.
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unknown to him even the prayers of the priests paid by Emperor Constantine 
XI to make prayers and fasts, all in the hope of preventing the Christians 
from being enslaved by the Ottomans81. It is so obvious that the declared 
union not only provoked the Ottoman aggression but neither did it secure 
any substantial assistance to besieged Constantinople and for these reasons 
Sphrantzes evaluates the Council of Ferrara – Florence negatively82. 
Sphrantzes’ views, however, contrast with the deep religious sentiment 
that characterizes both the ethos and the course of his life, as it is evident 
from several parts of his work83. He appears as a deeply religious man who 
experienced during his life a series of painful traumas which he always 
interpreted as providential punishment for the sins he had committed84. 
His deep religious feeling is revealed moreover by the frequent biblical 
references to his work85 and the extended narration of the Life and miracles 
of his godmother, which according to him, was a sanctified nun of some 
monastery in Constantinople86. He would retire to a monastery in Corfu, 
a few years before his death, submitting a confession of faith he recorded 
in his work and with which he condemned, among other things, the Latin 
doctrines as heresy87. He is also possessed by the typical Byzantine notion 
that human sins cause punishment from God who can even use the Ottomans 
as his executive body88. Even the final observations of his work confirm his 
typical Christian spiritual horizons, as he prays that the bodily pains he 
suffers will help towards the purification of his soul for his salvation89. It 
is no coincidence, therefore, that some scholars describe him as a moderate 
81. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXVI, 14: 142.9-14.
82. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXIII, 4: 80. 26-29, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 12: 86.1.  
83. Sfranze, Cronaca, 17*-20*. For the possibility, however, that this religious sentiment 
is just superficial, see C.J.G. turner, Pages from late byzantine philosophy of History, BZ 
57 (1964), 353-357. 
84. See, for example, Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXV, 11: 134 (capture by the Ottomans 
during the Fall of Constantinople); XLVIII, 1, 3: 190-194 (serious illness in the last days of 
his life).
85. See the Index Locorum of the Maisano edition (Sfranze, Cronaca, 267).  
86. Sfranze, Cronaca, XVIII: 46-52.  
87. Sfranze, Cronaca, XLV, 4: 184.  
88. Sfranze, Cronaca, XXXIX, 11: 156. 13-21.
89. Sfranze, Cronaca, XLVIII, 3: 194.  
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anti-unionist, focusing precisely on his deep religious sentiment90. It was 
this religious sentiment that was also blamed on the fact that Sphrantzes 
systematically avoided using the term “Roman” and its derivatives, which 
brings him even closer to the anti-unionist party that usually distances itself 
from Roman political legacy91.
We would expect, therefore, that such a devout Orthodox Christian 
would consider the Florentine Council as a betrayal of the traditional faith 
that God would punish with the victory of the Ottomans, unless byzantine 
people rejected the Decree of Union and remained faithful to the traditional 
doctrine, just as supported by the anti-unionist party. The anti-unionist 
party argued persistently that the church union declared in Florence 
was a grave sin that God would punish with the victory of the Ottomans 
and therefore with the destruction of the world92. This view dominates 
the writings of prominent anti-unionists even before the tragic event of 
the Fall, as is seen, for example, in the work of Gennadios Scholarios93. 
Scholarios, who became the undisputed leader of the anti-unity party after 
the death of Mark Eugenikos, considered the Florentine decree before the 
Fall as a product of unfair trade between Roman Catholics and Orthodox, 
with the latter exchanging without remorse their traditional doctrine in 
the hope of securing military aid from the West. This unfair transaction 
was expected to soon provoke the heavenly wrath that would punish the 
Orthodox for this betrayal of the traditional faith unless they rejected the 
Decree of Union and remained faithful to the traditional doctrine94. The 
90. See, for example, h. hunGer, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, 
v. I, München 1978, 497.
91. d.r. reinsCh, Η θεώρηση της πολιτικής και πολιτιστικής φυσιογνωμίας των 
Ελλήνων στους ιστορικούς της Άλωσης, Études Balkaniques (Cahiers Pierre Belon) 6 
(1999), 85-86; Ι. smarNakis, Rethinking Roman Identity after the Fall (1453): Perceptions 
of ‘Romanitas’ by Doukas and Sphrantzes, ΒυζΣύμμ 25 (2015), 227-233; yan. stouraitis, 
Reinventing Roman Ethnicity in High and Late Medieval Byzantium, Medieval Worlds 5 
(2017), 88. 
92. ih. ŠeVčenKo, Intellectual Repercussions of the Council of Florence, Church History 
24 (1955), 12-13 [hereafter: ŠeVčenKo, Intellectual Repercussions].
93. For Gennadios Scholarios, see m.- h. BlanChet, Georges – Gennadios Scholarios (vers 
1400-vers 1472). Un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l’empire byzantine [Archives 
de l’Orient chretien 20], Paris 2008 [hereafter: BlanChet, Georges – Gennadios Scholarios].  
94. ath. anGelou, Ο Γεννάδιος Σχολάριος και η Άλωση, in: Η Άλωση της Πόλης, ed. 
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pattern of divine punishment for betraying the faith is repeated in every 
text that Gennadios wrote after the Fall, that is when he became the first 
leader of the Ecumenical Patriarchate under the Ottoman rule95. However, 
this scheme is now combined with the parallel scheme of interpreting the 
Ottoman conquest as the ark of the salvation of the Orthodox people from 
the dangerous Latin domination96.
Despite his deep religious sentiment, Sphrantzes does not seem to share 
the anti-unionist concerns, since he appears as indifferent to dogmatic 
issues97. Sphrantzes looks forward to the peaceful coexistence of Christians 
of different dogmatic traditions, perhaps influenced by his stay in Latin-
dominated Corfu where he wrote his Chronicle98. Nevertheless he hurries 
to clarify that he remains faithful to the orthodox doctrine but just because 
it is part of his cultural heritage99. This, however, will not prevent him, 
just on the eve of the Fall of Constantinople, to propose to Emperor 
Constantine XI the appointment of Cardinal Isidore of Kiev as patriarch of 
Constantinople100. Neither will Sphrantzes hesitate to call Bessarion, after 
the Fall, as cardinal and as patriarch, which means that he recognized the 
title of patriarch given to him by the Pope101. These in no way imply that 
Sphrantzes can be described as unionist, as for example suggested by Nevra 
e. Chrysos [ΑΙΠΟΣ 15], Athens 1999, 105-106; BlanChet, Georges – Gennadios Scholarios, 
124-128.  
95. anGelou, Σχολάριος και Άλωση, 107 ff; BlanChet, Georges – Gennadios Scholarios, 
124-128; k. moustakas, Ottoman Greek views of ottoman rule (15th-16th Centuries). The 
Perspective of the patriarchate associates, in: Political Thought and Practice in the Ottoman 
Empire, ed. M. sariyannis, Rethymno 2019, 312-313. 
96. For a detailed study of Scholarios’ views on this subject, see anGelou, Σχολάριος 
και Άλωση, 99-132; BlanChet, Georges – Gennadios Scholarios, 124-135.  
97. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 2: 80. 6-7.
98. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 3: 80. 19-23 cited in n. 25.  
99. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΙΙΙ, 2: 80. 7-9 cited in n. 22.  
100. Sfranze, Cronaca, ΧΧΧVI, 5: 138.11-14: Εὑρεθέντος καὶ γὰρ τοῦ καρδηναλίου 
Ῥωσσίας εἰς τὴν Πόλιν, μέσος ἐγὼ παρ’ αὐτοῦ γέγονα εἰς τὸν ἀοίδιμον καὶ μακαρίτην 
αὐθέντην μου τὸν βασιλέα, ἵνα γένηται πατριάρχης· καὶ τὰ γένωνται παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ 
τότε πάπα, ἢ κἂν ἐκ δευτέρου νὰ μνημονευθῇ ὁ πάπας.
101. Sfranze, Cronaca, XLII, 11: 176.2-3: … τοῦ αἰδεσιμωτάτου καρδιναλίου τοῦ 
πατριάρχου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως Βησσαρίωνος …
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Necipoğlu102. Despite the fact that Sphrantzes is indifferent to dogmatic 
issues, he condemns latin doctrines as heretical in the confession of faith 
which he submits when he becomes a monk103. Neither does Sphrantzes 
accept the logic of historical causality adopted by pro-unionist authors, 
such as Doukas104, according to which the attitude of the warriors towards 
the ecclesiastical union contributed to the spiritual apostasy of the people 
from the true faith, thus provoking the divine anger and consequently the 
Fall105.
It is obvious that the religious dimension of the conflict between 
the unionists and the anti-unionists was not a criterion of Sphrantzes’ 
political behavior, despite its deep religious sentiment106. Sphrantzes is just 
an imperial official who is willing to do whatever is necessary to prevent 
Ottoman conquest and consequently the overthrow of the Empire, even if 
this means the implementation of the Union of Florence107. It is reasonable 
to assume that Sphrantzes as a trusted courtier of the emperor Manuel II is 
a moderate member of the chain of those politicians who from the middle of 
the 14th century and in spite of the Ottoman threat turned to a new political 
direction, aimed at the secularization of the state108. The supporters of this 
new political direction had gained support in the court of emperor Manuel 
II Palaeologus, who shared the basic principles of this political movement, 
as shows his interest in bringing under state control the vast ecclesiastical 
and monastic property in order to find resources for the benefit of state 
defense109. Emperor Manuel ΙΙ also managed to impose himself in the 
102. n. neCiPoğlu, Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins. Politics and 
Society in the Later Empire, Cambridge 2009, 9. 
103. Sfranze, Cronaca, XLV, 4: 184.  
104. Ducas, Istoria Turco-Byzantină, XXXVII 9: 327.12 – 329.4. On the attitude 
of  Doukas towards the ecclesiastical union, see S.K. krasaViNa, Duka I Sfrandzi ob unii 
pravoslavnoj i katoličeskoj cerkvej, V.V. 27 (1967), 142-147 [hereafter: krasaViNa, Duka I 
Sfrandzi]. 
105. ŠeVčenKo, Intellectual Repercussions, 8-9.
106. On the attitude of Sphrantzes towards the ecclesiastical union, see krasaViNa, 
Duka I Sfrandzi, 147-152. 
107. Sfranze, Cronaca, 10*-11*.
108. On the chain of those politicians, see, among other, n.siniossoGlou, Radical Platonism 
in Byzantium. Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon, Cambridge 2011, 359-376.  
109. G. ostroGorsKy, Pour l’ histoire de la feodalité byzantine, Bruxelles 1954, 161, 171-
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Byzantine Church in 1416, forcing its representatives to recognize in writing 
the imperial right to administer ecclesiastical affairs110. In both cases, the 
purpose was to bring the Church authority under central control and limit 
its political role, as the salvation of the state was a priority111.
George Sphrantzes, in conclusion, attempts to approach the Ferrara-
Florence Council while explaining the Fall with criteria that would suit a 
more experienced courtier and diplomat than a Christian believer of his 
time. Although he has typical Christian spiritual horizons, he approaches 
the events here solely applying diplomatic and political criteria. For this 
very reason, he goes back to the unifying policy that was adopted by 
Manuel II, the wise and realist Emperor, according to him, who succeeded 
in ensuring with intelligence and careful handling the balances necessary 
for the survival of the state, until they were overturned by the choice of his 
successor to proceed with the unification negotiations. The political choices 
of Emperor John VIII in turn instigated the Ottoman fears and precipitated 
the fall, which in the eyes of many Byzantines and Latins constitutes 
retaliation of some higher power for the spiritual apostasy of the Byzantines 
or the consequence of the subjects of the last Palaeologus refusing to accept 
the Florentine Decree of the Union of the Churches. However religious, 
George Sphrantzes, abstained from accepting one or the other reasoning, as 
his expressed indifference in doctrinal teachings made clear. In this way, he 
puts forward a more convincing case of historical causality and the Fall of 
Constantinople and the end of the Byzantine Empire; and this is a valuable 
historical and historiographical contribution.
173; m. Bartusis, Land and Privilege in Byzantium: the Institution of Pronoia, Cambridge 
2012, 551-570; K. smyrlis, The State, the Land and Private Property: Confiscating Monastic 
and Church Properties in the Palaiologan Period, in: Church and Society in Late Byzantium, 
ed. d. anGeloV, Kalamazoo 2009, 66-72.
110. Β.Κ. ΣτεφανίδηΣ, Ὁ ἀκραῖος σταθμὸς τῆς ἐξελίξεως τῶν σχέσεων Ἐκκλησίας 
καὶ Πολιτείας τοῦ Βυζαντίου καὶ τὰ ἄμεσα ἀποτελέσματα αὐτοῦ (1416-1439), ΕΕΒΣ 23 
(1953) 27-30; BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus, 323; leonte, Imperial Visions, 24-31; ÇeliK, 
Manuel II Palaiologos, 299 ff. 
111. BarKer, Manuel II Palaeologus, 395 ff; KiousoPoulou, Βασιλεύς ή Οικονόμος, 
212-214, 223-232; leonte, Imperial Visions, 31.
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εΚΚληΣίαΣτίΚη ενωΣη Καί ίΣορροπία δυναΜεων Στο υΣτερο Βυζαντίο: 
η Μαρτυρία του ΓεωρΓίου Σφραντζη
Η παρούσα εργασία εστιάζει στην αξιολόγηση της Συνόδου Φερράρας 
– Φλωρεντίας στην οποία προέβη ο Γεώργιος Σφραντζής στο ιστοριο- 
γραφικό του έργο, το οποίο γράφτηκε λίγες μόλις δεκαετίες ύστερα από 
την Άλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης (1453). Η επιλογή να εστιάσουμε 
στον συγκεκριμένο συγγραφέα δεν είναι τυχαία. Η συμμετοχή του 
Σφραντζή σε πολλαπλές διπλωματικές αποστολές, αλλά και τα 
διάφορα κυβερνητικά αξιώματα που του ανατέθηκαν κατά καιρούς, 
τον καθιστούν άριστο γνώστη των θεμάτων της εξωτερικής πολιτικής 
της Αυτοκρατορίας αλλά και των λόγων που οδήγησαν κάθε φορά 
τον εκάστοτε αυτοκράτορα σε συγκεκριμένες πολιτικές αποφάσεις. 
Η ιστορική του αφήγηση, επί πλέον, δεν απηχεί ιδεολογικές συγκρούσεις 
ούτε θρησκευτικές διενέξεις. Έτσι, η μαρτυρία του συμβάλλει απο- 
φασιστικά στην καλύτερη δυνατή κατανόηση των κριτηρίων βάσει 
των οποίων οι τελευταίοι υιοθέτησαν τη συγκεκριμένη πολιτική, ενώ 
παράλληλα μας επιτρέπει να κατανοήσουμε πώς αυτή αντιμετωπίστηκε 
από ένα τμήμα τουλάχιστον των κυβερνητικών αξιωματούχων της εποχής 
εκείνης. 
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